国家计划生育委员会


国家计生委关于贯彻《流动人口计划生育工作管理办法》的若干意见

(2001-3-21)


省、自治区、直辖市计生委：
　　
随着我国改革开放的深入和经济建设的快速发展，流动人口大量增加。人口的流动，有利于劳动力资源的合理配置，促进经济发展，也给计划生育工作带来新的问题和困难。加强流动人口计划生育工作是新形势下我国人口与计划生育工作的重要内容。为了切实抓好流动人口计划生育工作，经国务院批准发布了《流动人口计划生育工作管理办法》（以下简称《办法》），明确了流动人口计划生育工作的管理原则，将流动人口计划生育工作纳入法制化轨道。《中共中央国务院关于加强人口与计划生育工作稳定低生育水平的决定》（以下简称《决定》）也明确要加强对流动人口的综合管理。为了全面落实《决定》的要求，解决各地在实施《办法》中出现的问题，进一步做好流动人口的计划生育管理与服务工作，促进形成综合治理流动人口的局面，现提出如下意见：

一、建立、健全流动人口计划生育综合治理工作体制和机制，切实落实目标管理责任制
　　流动人口计划生育管理是计划生育工作的重点和难点之一，必须在各级党委、政府的统一领导和协调下，有关部门各负其责，密切协作，进行综合治理，才能把这项工作抓紧抓好，落到实处。各级计划生育部门要进一步提高思想认识，树立全局观念。要按照《决定》的要求，积极争取各级党委、政府高度重视流动人口计划生育工作，由党委、政府统一协调，将流动人口计划生育工作纳入社会治安综合治理的内容，切实解决流动人口计划生育工作机构、队伍、经费保障问题，进一步明确和强化政府及各有关部门的职责，分工负责，齐抓共管，建立流动人口计划生育管理目标责任制，加强对基层党委、政府及各有关部门的检查、考核和监督；要主动协调公安、工商、劳动保障、卫生、房产管理等有关部门，切实履行职责，加强部门协作；要进一步明确计划生育系统各业务部门在流动人口计划生育工作中的责任，加强考核，推进流动人口计划生育综合治理工作。

　　二、认真贯彻《办法》规定的管理原则，落实“两地”管理责任，建立“两地”协作制度
　　流动人口户籍地、现居住地（以下简称“两地”）要严格执行《办法》规定的流动人口计划生育工作实行“两地”共同管理、以现居住地为主的原则和国家计生委《流动人口婚育证明管理规定》中关于“两地”管理责任的规定，认真负责地做好工作。

　　流动人口户籍地要在成年流动人口外出前开展必要的、有效的计划生育宣传教育；做好《流动人口婚育证明》（以下简称《婚育证明》）办证、换证工作，对已外出的应予补办，努力提高办证率；从为群众服务、减轻群众负担出发，热诚为流动人口提供各项服务，严格做到不高收费、不乱收费、不“搭车”收费；负责任地做好与现居住地的联系和信息沟通工作。

　　流动人口现居住地要加强对《婚育证明》的查验工作，负责对已婚育龄女性流动人口的日常管理工作，努力提高验证率；督促未办理《婚育证明》的流动人口限期补办，不得在现居住地代办《婚育证明》，不得以临时服务卡长期替代《婚育证明》；维护《婚育证明》的统一性、权威性，不得以地方自行印制的流动人口婚育证明（或其他类似证件）在本地取代《婚育证明》。

　　对流动人口的计划外生育行为，由其现居住地或户籍地依法予以处理。

　　为加强“两地”协作，各地根据实际情况，要建立以下具体管理制度：

　　1．户籍地流动人口计划生育管理合同制度。户籍地村、居委会（或乡镇、街道）要与流动人口中的已婚育龄妇女（或需要签订合同的育龄人员）签订计划生育管理合同，明确双方的权利与义务，应遵守的有关流动人口计划生育管理法规、规章，以及避孕节育检查情况等信息反馈时间、方式等。合同的有效期应与《婚育证明》的有效期一致。

　　2．现居住地流动人口计划生育经常化管理制度。将已婚育龄流动人口纳入现居住地的日常管理，实行与户籍人口同宣传，同服务，同管理，同考核。

　　3．“两地”信息通报制度。现居住地与户籍地要通过《流动人口育龄妇女计划生育信息通报单》（以下简称《信息通报单》，及时通报流动人口中未持《婚育证明》或出现节育措施与证明所记载不相符合、无生育计划即怀孕等情况，以及有关育龄妇女婚姻、生育、避孕节育、缴纳社会抚养费等信息。收到《信息通报单》的一方必须及时回复，并配合做好有关工作。未及时回复的，由上级计划生育部门督促回复并根据情况给予通报批评。

　　《信息通报单》由国家计生委规定统一格式（见附件１）。各省（区、市）计生委按照统一格式和要求，自行印制。

　　4．“两地”协调制度。流出和流入人口较多的省级计生委间建立联席会议或协调制度，定期商定有关共同管理的原则和制度，加强对重点、难点问题的协调解决。省计生委政策法规处（或流动人口处）负责协调具体事项。

　　5．逐步实现流动人口计划生育信息计算机管理。积极创造条件，逐步采用计算机管理系统，做好“两地”间的信息联络、反馈工作。与公安等部门联合办公进行流动人口计划生育管理的地方，应首先配备计算机。

　　三、实行全国统一格式的《流动人口避孕节育情况报告单》

　　为落实“以现居住地为主”的管理原则，维护群众合法权益，防止弄虚作假，全国使用统一格式的《流动人口避孕节育情况报告单》（以下简称《报告单》）。

　　1．《报告单》由国家计生委规定统一格式（见附件２）。各省（区、市）计生委按照统一格式和要求，自行印制。

　　2．《报告单》由受委托的计划生育技术服务机构或县以上定点医疗机构出具，加盖现居住地县（市、区）或乡（镇、街道）计划生育部门（或流动人口计划生育管理机构）印章（或钢印）后，在现居住地及户籍地有效。

　　四、严格禁止侵害流动人口合法权益的行为

　　严格执行《办法》中关于维护流动人口合法权益的规定，严格禁止侵害公民合法权益的行为发生。各地应做到：

　　1．不得违反“七个不准”规定，组织流动人口中未婚女青年进行避孕节育情况检查。

　　2．不得强行要求流动人口返回户籍地进行避孕节育情况检查。

　　3．不得在办理《婚育证明》、开展流动人口避孕节育情况检查、签订计划生育合同时乱收费、“搭车”收费。

　　4．对流动人口违反计划生育法规规定的计划外生育行为，现居住地或户籍地中一方已向当事人送达社会抚养费征收通知书的，另一方不得违反“一事不再罚”的原则，再次向当事人征收。

　　发生上述行为之一的，由上级计划生育行政主管部门按照行政执法责任制度予以追究；屡禁不止的，给予通报批评。

　　五、加大流动人口计划生育工作保障力度

　　《办法》第三条规定，地方各级政府要对流动人口计划生育工作提供必要的保障。《办法》的《释义》也明确指出，“提供必要的保障”主要是指人、财、物的投入。各地在地方机构改革中，要积极争取地方党委、政府设立必要的流动人口计划生育管理机构，并根据基层工作需要，配备必要的人员。流动人口计划生育工作经费科目已列入各级财政预算，除向流动人口征收流动人口计划生育管理费（或统一征收流动人口管理费，按一定比例划拨计划生育部门）外，各地应积极与财政部门协调，争取解决流动人口计划生育宣传、管理、避孕药具及节育技术服务等经费问题。

　　六、逐步完善流动人口计划生育统计和考核制度

　　流动人口计划生育统计应成为独立体系。流动人口计划生育考核应纳入各级计划生育工作考核。在未建立全国统一的流动人口计划生育管理统计和考核制度前，各地应根据本省（区、市）行之有效的经验和做法，探索建立流动人口计划生育统计、考核制度。国家计生委将本着先易后难、逐步规范的原则，研究制定《流动人口计划生育统计、考核办法》。目前，应首先统计、考核下列内容：

　　１．流动人口现居住地应建立《流动人口已婚育龄妇女计划生育信息登记卡》（以下简称《信息登记卡》），对有关信息进行统计。

　　《信息登记卡》由国家计生委规定统一格式（见附件３）。各省（区、市）计生委按照统一格式和要求，自行印制。

　　２．为掌握流动人口出生情况，便于进行管理与服务，应在流动人口子女出生地进行流动人口出生统计。流动人口在现居住地居住超过6个月的作为常住人口在现居住地统计，居住不满6个月的，由现居住地将及其所生育子女的孩次、有无生育计划、户籍地及身份证号等信息统计后上报，上级计生委将户籍地和现居住地均为本辖区的流动人口出生计入本地的出生数中，将本辖区以外流入的人口的上述信息再报上一级计生委，最后，各省（区、市）计生委将外省（区、市）流入本省（区、市）的流动人口的出生数上报国家计生委（报表式样另发）。

　　３．考核户籍地《婚育证明》办证率、现居住地《婚育证明》验证率。

　　４．考核“两地”协调制度规定的工作目标。

　　５．考核流动人口计划生育综合治理成员单位工作目标责任制度的落实情况。

　　国家计生委每年对１-２个省（区、市）的流动人口计划生育管理情况进行检查，并将检查结果通报全国。

　　七、关于流动人口生育政策适用和生育计划审批问题

　　流动人口生育政策的适用和生育计划的审批，涉及“两地”计划生育法规规定协调问题的，按以下原则办理：

　　1．流动人口适用女方户籍地的生育政策，由该户籍地审批生育计划。

　　2．实行户籍制度改革的城镇，流动人口所生育子女可以在其现居住地办理户籍登记手续的，适用现居住地的生育政策，由该现居住地审批生育计划。

　　3．应审发生育服务证等有关计划生育证明的计划生育部门，未按规定或无充足理由拒绝审发而造成计划外生育后果的，列入其所在地考核内容。

　　八、检查与监督

　　国家计生委将组织对各地贯彻、落实《办法》情况的检查和抽样调查，并对出现管理责任不落实、《婚育证明》办证率及验证率不高、信息通报不负责、高收费或乱收费、拒绝为流动人口审发生育计划、侵害流动人口合法权益等情况的地方进行通报并给予必要的制约。

　　各地可将跨省（区、市）的难于协调的问题及时向国家计生委反映，由国家计生委进行协调。

　　附件：１．《流动人口育龄妇女计划生育信息通报单》格式
　　　 　２．《流动人口避孕节育情况报告单》格式
　　　　 ３．《流动人口计划生育信息登记卡》格式
二○○一年三月二十一日

Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.